I Introduction
In 1994 the Republican Party won a majority of seats in the United States House of Representatives for the first time in 40 years. The credit (or blame depending on political preference) for this feat has been directed, in part, at the large number of majority Black voter districts created in the preceding round of redistricting. The attribution reflects a long and widely held belief that the creation of majority minority districts moves Congress in a more conservative direction. This view has been espoused prior to, during, and now after the 1990 redistricting in the face of more than a decade's worth of post-event data. During the redistricting period, the Republican Party rhetorically and financially supported the creation of the maximum number of majority minority districts possible.
2 Democratic state legislatures, on the other hand, largely
wanted to create fewer majority minority districts than the Justice Department mandated.
Theoretically the impact of majority minority districts on the makeup of the state's congressional delegation is ambiguous, that ambiguity perhaps best illustrated by the fact that both the Republican Party and the NAACP support their creation. Majority Black districts generally elect Black Democratic Representatives, who vote more liberally than their White
Democratic counterparts, and thus move the delegation in a more liberal direction. However, the uncertainty of the total impact of majority Black district creation on the ideological leaning of a state's House delegation stems from the impossibility of theoretically quantifying how candidate positioning and constituent vote choice endogenously respond to district configuration.
Thus this question must be adjudicated empirically. And in fact there is a long line of empirical literature, cited by the Supreme Court and election law casebooks (Cox and Holden, forthcoming) , supporting the Parties' view that majority minority districts benefit the Republican Party. However, this literature does not directly empirically estimate the impact of a state 2 To help maximize the number of majority minority districts created, the Republican National Committee developed and distributed software to minority groups to allow these groups to construct their own redistricting plans to submit to their state legislatures for consideration (Cunningham, 2001) .Wrote Republican strategist Lee Atwater (1990) , "Where minority districts currently exist, they must be maintained…where minority districts can be created they must be created."
redistricting plan that includes majority minority districts on the party affiliation and voting behavior of the representatives that that state sends to Congress. Instead, many of these studies use cross-sectional and/or panel data on select districts to show that as the percent of Black voters decreases in a district, the likelihood of electing a Republican increases and the voting record of the elected representative moves in a more conservative direction. (See for example Hill 1995 , Lublin 1997 , Bullock 1995 and Overby and Cosgrove 1996 .) The authors then argue that, presumably because of nonlinearities in the relationship between constituent race and representatives' likelihood of voting liberally, the increased liberal voting in districts that gain
Blacks is more than offset by the decrease in liberal voting in districts that lose Blacks. Thus these authors posit that there is a tradeoff between Black descriptive (representatives who look like them) and Black substantive (representatives who vote as they would vote) representation.
(See for example Swain, 2006) . There are three limitations to this type of analysis: 1) The analysis is performed at too low a level of aggregation. Because some districts are moving in a more liberal direction and others in a more conservative direction, one needs to aggregate to the state level to measure the full impact of the state's creation of majority Black districts. In fact, at the state level Shotts (2003) finds that the number of representatives who vote to the left of the congressional median is increasing in the number of majority minority districts. 3 2) These studies generally lack a control state from which we can understand how the state's House delegation would have evolved in the absence of the creation of majority Black districts. 4 3) These studies do not account for potential bias due to the endogeneity of the decision to create majority Black districts. 3 Another exception to district level analysis is Cameron, Epstein and O'Halloran's (1996) simulation of the characteristics of post-1990 state level delegations using pre-1990 data. The authors conclude that majority minority districts lead to more conservative state delegations. 4 The contention that the increase in conservative voting in the congressional delegations of states that created majority minority districts was matched by an increase in conservative voting in the House as a whole was stated, but not formally tested, by Guinier (1995) and Engstrom (1995) .
In this paper, I directly address the question of how majority minority districts impact Black representation. I primarily focus on the southern United States where the Black population is large and the number of majority Black districts increased from six to 20 with the 1990
redistricting. I employ a difference-in-difference design comparing southern states that faced greater pressure to increase their share of majority Black districts with those southern states that faced less pressure. I consider a variety of outcomes: the racial and party make-up of the delegation as well as how liberal their voting record is in general and with respect to those issues that are of greatest concern to minorities. My time frame is the five congressional sessions before and after the 1990 redistricting, which allows for examination of two shocks to the number of majority minority districts: 1) The initial charge to create more majority minority districts and 2)
The later order to dismantle more than half of the new creations following court rulings declaring them in violation of White voters' equal protection. Finally, I expand consideration to a second liberal leaning minority: Latinos in the southwest.
I find no evidence that the creation of majority minority districts moved states' delegation in a more conservative direction. While majority Black districts significantly increased the number of Blacks in Congress, they did not significantly increase the number of Republicans or move the delegation's voting record to the right. (In fact point estimates, though mostly insignificant, indicate a leftward movement in the delegation's voting behavior.) This finding holds controlling for state demographics and linear year trends and is robust to varying the definition of treatment and control states. Finally, I find that in the southwest, the creation of majority Latino districts also does not move the delegation in a more conservative direction.
One limitation of this work may be its generalizeability. This is a case study of a single redistricting period. However, it is the redistricting period in this country that saw the largest increase in the number of majority minority districts. The Republican takeover of the House two years after this redistricting is the most cited evidence for majority minority districts increasing congressional conservatism. I demonstrate that this historical event actually provides evidence against the conventional view.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: In Section II I discuss the limitations of theoretical arguments on the impact of majority Black districts on delegation conservatism. In Section III I provide relevant institutional detail. I detail data and methodology in Section IV, before presenting the empirical results in Section V. I conclude in Section VI.
Theory
In contrast to the conventional view, economic theory predicts that majority minority districts do not increase congressional conservatism. In fact, the optimal redistricting literature concludes that these districts weakly move a delegation in a more liberal direction. 5 Gilligan and Matsusaka (1999) model the decision of a partisan gerrymanderer, with no majority minority district requirement and certainty over voter behavior. In order for the gerrymanderer to create the maximum number of winning districts for his party, he must create as many districts as possible in which his party wins by one vote. Shotts (2001 Shotts ( , 2002 extends the model to allow for a majority minority mandate. He argues that to a first approximation Blacks are Democrats.
Therefore, the majority minority district constraint only binds on those Republican gerrymanderers who in the absence of the majority minority requirement would not create any districts that are majority Democratic. added to that list during the 1975 renewal when Congress added failure to provide electoral materials in a language spoken by more than five percent of the population as a criterion. (Table 1 lists states by coverage status.)
The greater pressure on covered states to increase the number of majority minority districts stems from the 1982 renewal of the VRA. At that time Congress amended the law from 8 For a more comprehensive summary please see Washington (2011) . 9 Discriminatory electoral procedures include, but are not limited to, literacy tests, withholding information from minority voters or potential candidates, eliminating political jurisdictions or redrawing political boundaries to prevent minorities from attaining office. 10 The preclearance provision was aimed at preventing states from circumventing the spirit of the law as some southern states had done to keep de facto all White primaries after the practice had been disallowed de jure (United States Commission on Civil Rights, 1984). For example, Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi and South Carolina tried to divorce primaries from state governance so that laws that were binding on the state would not be binding on the primary procedure (United States Commission on Civil Rights, 1968). 11 Only parts of North Carolina and Florida are covered. However, when even one political jurisdiction within a state is subject to Section V, the state's entire congressional redistricting plan must be pre-cleared.
forbidding "discriminatory intent" in electoral procedures to forbidding "discriminatory results" The 1990 redistricting process in all southern states was controlled by majority Democratic legislatures. Although they did not want to, the Democratic legislators in the covered states understood that they were mandated to create more majority Blacks districts. 14 And so they did. In North Carolina the Democratic legislature submitted a plan to the Justice Department that increased the number of majority Black districts from zero to one; Georgia submitted a plan that increased the number of majority Black districts from one to two. However, both plans, like the plan from Virginia, a state with a Black governor, were rejected by the Department of Justice on the grounds that even more majority Black districts could be created, as evidenced by alternative plans submitted by Republican legislators, the NAACP and the ACLU (Cunningham, 2001 ).
After all the revisions and final approvals, the number of majority Black districts grew from three to 16 in covered southern states, with increases in every covered state except one. 15 The number of majority Black districts increased by one in the uncovered states.
Following this exogenous (to the will of the state legislature) increase in the number of majority Black districts, there was an exogenous decrease, that I will, to a limited extent, also use for identification. The decrease was a result of legal challenges to these new districts filed by
White voters who argued that districts created to protect the rights of Black voters, violated the equal protection of Whites. These plaintiffs eventually prevailed. Within six years of the initial 1990 redistricting, seven of the 13 new majority-Black districts (spanning five of eight southern covered states that had created them) were redrawn such that Blacks were no longer a majority.
After laying out data and methodology, I ask whether this increase in Black majority districts was accompanied by a decrease in substantive representation, as often argued.
Data and Methodology
In order to evaluate the impact of majority minority districts on minority representation I create the following measures. 3) DW-nominate scores: ADA scores have been criticized for focusing on only the most polarizing votes (Snyder, 1992) and for their lack of comparability over time. Therefore in addition to the ADA scores, I employ Poole and Rosenthal's (2007) Groseclose, Levitt and Snyder (1999) . Such an adjustment would be inappropriate in this analysis because it relies on restrictions to the evolution of a representative's mean preferences across years. I want to allow a representative's voting record to evolve freely with district composition. I focus on ten congressional sessions. The 98 th -102 nd (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (Stratmann, 2000) . In what I refer to subsequently as specification 2, this vector is expanded to include demographic characteristics that predict the state's political leaning: state poverty, high school graduation and employment rates and these measures for the state's Black population in particular. 22 These additional covariates are calculated using March Current Population Survey data. Specification 3 includes the covariates of the previous specification in addition to state*year linear trends to allow for states to be trending differently politically overtime.
Standard errors are clustered at the state level to allow for serial correlation and dependence within state observations. Because small numbers of clusters tends to lead to over rejection of the null, I follow Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008) in determining significance based on a t distribution with degrees of freedom one less than the number of clusters.
Results
The basic results are illustrated in Figure 1 . The goal of the majority minority district mandate was to increase the number of Blacks in congress. It worked, panel B shows. The share of Black representatives among uncovered districts remained basically flat across the ten congresses. In the covered states there was a small increase in share Black in the pre-period as the result of majority Black districts created in the 22 In the tabled results I do not control directly for the political leaning of the state population so as not to control away any endogenous political behavior response that might lead to a correlation between majority minority districts and conservative leaning of the congressional delegation. One concern with such an omission is that in the post period the voters of the covered districts may want the delegation to move in a relatively more liberal direction while the creation of the majority minority districts is pulling the delegation in a more conservative direction and because of these opposing forces I obtain a null finding. However, this concern is assuaged by two findings 1) Results are robust to the inclusion of the Democratic share of the two party presidential vote and 2) By both the presidential vote and the NES liberal conservative scale covered districts are relatively more conservative in the post period. In the first column of Table 3 To put the point estimates in perspective it is helpful to note that the increase in the ADA score is higher than expected based solely on the change in party composition. The 13 percentage point increase in share Democratic (column 3) times 62, the difference in average ADA score between Democrats and Republicans in my sample period, yields an 8 point expected increase in average ADA. The larger actual increase in ADA score is due in part to the fact that majority minority districts result in the election of Black Democrats who are more liberal than the White Democrats they replace. Further evidence of this is the fact that there is not a simple mean shift in the voting record in the treated delegations. There is an increase in voting dispersion as well. The final row of the table presents results using the standard deviation of ADA score as an outcome and shows a positive (and significant in two specifications) coefficient on vra*post.
The remainder of the table examines the robustness of the finding that an increase in majority Black districts in a state is accompanied by an increase in the share Black in the state's delegation, but not an increase in the conservative leaning of that delegation. In the fourth column I demonstrate robustness to moving from measuring the impact on the average state to the impact on the average Black resident, by weighting observation by the Black population in the state/year.
In the final columns of the table I examine robustness to alternative definitions of treatment and control states. In column 5 I eliminate the Civil War's Border States. The fact that these states were not part of the confederacy suggests that their historic relationship with Blacks may be different from states of the deeper south. In column 6 I limit the treatment states to Texas and Florida, the two southern states which fall under Section V not because of past transgressions against Black voters but because of a failure to offer Spanish language electoral materials. I once again include Border States. This specification matches treatment and control states, neither of which in 1965 was judged as having discriminatory voting practices against Black Americans. In the final column of the table instead of classifying states based on Section V status, I consider a state as under pressure to create majority minority districts if the share of Black Representatives in the last congressional session before the 1990 redistricting is less than the share Black in the population and if another Black Representative could be added without increasing the number of Black Representatives over parity. 23 ("Rough proportionality," Cox and Holden, forthcoming, argue makes it less likely that a court would require the state to create an additional majority minority district.) The finding that majority Black districts significantly increase the fraction of Black representatives in the delegation, but do not significantly increase conservatism is robust to the three alternative definitions of treatment and control status.
Thus far, I have focused on the impact of the mandated increase in majority minority districts. While the focus on this simple dd is driven by power considerations, in an additional robustness check I consider a second exogenous shock to the share of majority Black districts: the court ordered dismantling of several majority Black districts. Under the theory that majority minority districts increase conservatism, the dismantling should lead to an increase in liberalism in the state's delegation. To test whether such an increase occurs, I run, on the full sample, an expanded version of equation 1 in which I include the triple interaction of covered, post and a dummy for the 105 th -107 th congresses (which follow the dismantling). As shown in Table 4 , I find no evidence of such an increase. Point estimates while insignificant, show a positive association between more (fewer) majority minority districts and more liberalism (conservatism).
Although I focus on a single redistricting, there is more than one minority group affected.
In a final robustness check, I examine the impact of the increase in majority Latino voter districts in the southwest on the representation of Latinos, another liberal leaning minority group protected under the Voting Rights Act. 24 To make the analysis as comparable as possible to that for Black voters in the south, I focus attention on seven states in which Latinos have a long history because they were formerly parts of Mexico. 25 Of the seven, Arizona, Texas and California are covered, while Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico and Utah are not. (See Table 5 for a list of sample states and their share of majority Latino districts and representatives over time.) Although the results are noisier, as shown in Table 6 , the finding that majority minority districts do not increase conservatism is robust to a change from Black to Latino districts. I find that this trade off did not exist following the redistricting that resulted in the largest increase in majority minority districts in US history. While majority Black districts increased the number of Blacks in congress, they did not increase the number of Republicans or produce more conservative state delegations. In fact, most point estimates indicate an increase in delegation liberalism both for majority Black districts in the south and for majority Latino districts in the southwest. In summary, I find no support for the view that majority minority districts decrease minority representation. 25 The results are robust to weighting states by Latino population and to changing the sample to states whose 1990 population was at least 10 percent Latino. 26 Please see Washington (2011) for graphical Latino results. 2/9 1/9 2/9 1/9 1/9 Tennessee 16 1/9 1/9 1/9 1/9 1/9 1/9
Sources: 1990 percent black from census using American Fact Finder. Majority minority districts, based on the racial makeup of the population at the time of the 1990 census, from various issues of the Almanac of American Politics and Lublin (2000-2001) . 
